Abstract

In this talk, I will present some recent development on Stackelberg reinsurance games. The first part introduces a tractable Stackelberg game model to study a single reinsurance contracting problem in which the insurer (buyer) chooses the contract indemnity, and the reinsurer (seller) sets the contract premium. We are able to obtain closed-form equilibrium strategies for both players and discuss their economic implications. The second part studies a chain of Stackelberg reinsurance games, in which the risk from the insurer is shared sequentially among n reinsurers. We not only solve such n linked games explicitly but also analyze the optimality of reinsurance chains. In the last part, we will briefly mention another reinsurance structure – tree, in which the risk from the insurer is shared parallelly among reinsurers.

This talk is based on a series of joint works with Jingyi Cao (York), Dongchen Li (Brock), and Virginia Young (Michigan).